Doing the best one can and the principle of alternative possibilities

Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):113-127 (1994)
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I defend the view that if one ought (morally) always to do the best one can, there cannot be a wrong action one cannot avoid performing for which one is morally responsible. I also argue that there cannot be a wrong action to which there are no alternative possibilities for which an agent is morally responsible if the thesis that ought' implies can' is true. My argument against a fully general principle of alternative possibilities does have implications, which I briefly discuss, for conditions that must be satisfied if a person is to be blameworthy for performing actions



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Ishtiyaque Haji
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.
I Ought, Therefore I Can Obey.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.

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