Dworkin, Rights, and Persons

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):413 - 423 (1979)
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Abstract

In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin defends the thesis that some, at least, of the rights people have, and in particular the most fundamental rights such as free speech and religious freedom, are “rights against the state”. By this he means that they identify modes of action that individuals ought to be permitted to carry out, and interference with which ought to be banned, even if a majority in the society prefer that the actions be prohibited or prefer some other condition achievement of which would require prohibiting them.

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Larry Haworth
University of Waterloo

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