Interests, Wrongs, and the Injury Hypothesis

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):102-109 (2017)
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Abstract

I show that cases of harmless wronging only pose a problem for interest-based theories if we accept a significant assumption about the relationship between interests and wrongs.

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Richard Healey
London School of Economics

References found in this work

Who Can Be Wronged?Rahul Kumar - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2):99-118.
Beyond the Harm Principle.Arthur Ripstein - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (3):215-245.

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