Confirmation Bias

In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 317–320 (2018-05-09)
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Abstract

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, “confirmation bias”. Confirmation bias is the human tendency only to look for evidence that confirms what one wants to believe or what one already thinks is true. Usually people are not too keen to look for evidence against what they want to believe is true. The human propensity for self‐delusion is strong. When one is confronted with sufficient evidence against some belief that one holds, what one should do is reject that belief ‐ at least if one is concerned with truth. When we surround ourselves with people and views that already agree with our own, we can draw erroneous conclusions. Confirmation bias greatly hinders one's ability to find the truth. Confirmation bias and evidence denial is why we start “seeing something everywhere” once you learn about it. The more scrutiny a belief can withstand, the more likely it is that it's true.

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