Constructive Nature of Perception

In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 324–329 (2018-05-09)
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Abstract

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: the constructive nature of human perception. Many of the things that we believe are generated by our senses interacting with the outside world. Our brains make decisions about what information to interpret and how to do so mostly based on our assumptions, preconceptions, and desires. An assumption that informs how we interpret the information that our brain receives is that the size, color, and shape of objects is constant. This allows us to perceive an object the same way even if how we are seeing it is changing. There are of course countless visual illusions that demonstrate this fact. This is why science has proved to be such a powerful tool in understanding the world; it is designed specifically to guard against the way our senses can lead us astray.

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