Mistaking the Relevance of Proximate Causation

In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 181–184 (2018-05-09)
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Abstract

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'proximate causation'. One commits this variety of causal fallacy when one mistakes the relevance of proximate causation. One mistakes the relevance of proximate causation when one thinks the fact that something is a proximate cause makes it irrelevant to the story of how the event in question happened. Mistaking the relevance of proximate causation can also “go the other way”. That is, one can overinflate the importance of something being a proximate cause. This is often done by those looking to avoid responsibility for their actions. Matters of causation are never simple. And sometimes whether something is a proximate cause is relevant to the issue at hand. But we must be careful to make sure that we do not mistake its relevance.

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