Abstract

Although the emlocus classicus /emof the concept of recognition is the master/slave episode of the Phenomenology, it is readily portable into the emPhilosophy of Right/em. However, the fact that the term occurs only six times in the 400 pages of the emPhilosophy of Right/em has obscured its structural role, and accordingly scholarly effort is scant on the concept as it might pertain to this work. It is the argument of this paper that despite its lsquo;invisibilityrsquo; it governs foreground proceedings as if from behind a curtain, for it cannot be gainsaid that the conceptual foundation of the Rights empresupposes/em the principle of recognition. The suspicion has been voiced that Hegel deliberately emsuppressed/em reminders of the presence of emAnerkennung/em in his philosophy of rights in order to distance himself from the perceived limitations of the Fichtean exposition of the concept. Accordingly this paper brings up the background of Fichte and examines the PhR in its strategic dispositions to uncover the recognitive structure implied in it