Abstract

In the chapter "Of Identity and Diversity" of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke claims that justice is based on personal identity and that personal identity is based on consciousness. However, this view of justice leads to an impasse when the defendant alleges that he has no consciousness of the crime and, therefore, that he does not identify himself as the person who committed the crime: if it is not possible to determine that he is the one who committed the crime, can we say that the punishment is just? This article seeks (i) to analyse the impasse exploring (a) its conceptual framework and (b) its development in the letters Molyneux and Locke exchanged in order (ii) to elaborate a criticism of Locke’s answer to it. Compared to the secondary bibliography, in which one objection to Locke’s answer is well established, the originality of this article consists in elaborating a new objection based on the distinction between the first and third person perspectives and in showing that, when questioned by Molyneux, Locke failed to discuss the conceptual issue necessary to give an adequate answer to the impasse. Keywords: Locke, Molyneux, personal identity, justice.