Abstract

This dissertation is an essay in analytic ontology whose main concern is to examine the ontological status of qualities and quality-instances. The primary thesis defended is that a Realist view of qualities is true--qualities are universals and not particulars--and quality-instances like red are complex entities with at least three constituents in them--a universal, an individuator, and a tie of predication. ;In the Introduction, six features of exemplification are clarified by examining different ways of assaying states of affairs like the-F-of-a . The role of language in ontology is also discussed. It is argued that ontological problems cannot be reduced to linguistic phenomena, but the latter can provide limited, evidential support to a position taken on some ontological problem, such as the problems of universals. ;In chapters one through four, a view called Trope Nominalism is stated and criticized. In chapter one, Trope Nominalism is defined and the two main arguments for Trope Nominalism are refuted. Trope Nominalism is the view that quality-instances, such as red, are basic, simple, abstract particulars called tropes. "Universals," such as redness, are sets of red tropes that exactly resemble one another. Advocates are D. C. Williams and Keith Campbell. In chapter two, the Trope view of predication is criticized by focusing on the simplicity and individuation of tropes. In chapter three, the Trope view of abstract reference is criticized. In chapter four, the Trope view of exact similarity is rejected by showing it leads to a vicious infinite regress. ;In chapters five and six, different Realist accounts of qualities and quality-instances are treated. Chapter five shows that the Realist views of Nicholas Wolterstorff and Michael Loux are inadequate. Wolterstorff and Loux redefine Realism by holding that universals are kinds whose instances are simple entities that are members of their kinds. Chapter six presents what a Realist assay of qualities and quality-instances should look like and argues that, in one interpretation, Edmund Husserl held this view. Qualities are ones-in-many. Quality instances are complex entities.