Abstract

In a famous argument, William L. Rowe proposed that, since probably there are pointless evils but since, if God exists, there are no pointless evils, probably there is no God. Some defenses against this argument use a cognitive‐limitations premise. But the skepticism in such defenses may spread in unintended and undesired ways. In this chapter, I argue that their skepticism leaves skeptical theists without good reason to think: (1) that any actions they may regard as morally impermissible are sins, (2) that they understand the concept of divine goodness or have an I‐Thou relationship with God, (3) that they have any inkling of God's reasons or intentions in designing or bringing about or sustaining the physical universe, assuming God did or does, and (4) that various alleged occurrences are miracles. In sum, I argue that, insofar as certain key theistic concepts are concerned, skeptical theists find themselves without good reason to think that the God of their faith is not beyond their comprehension.