Theoria 21 (2):213-232 (2006)
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EI debate entre la concepción descriptivista de los nombres propios y la teoría de la referencia directa concierne -principalmente- a esta cuestión: (es la función referencial de los nombres propios reduciblemediante la función descriptiva y las funciones logicas? Una tesis distintiva central de Kripke es 10 que denominamos particularismo semántico modal: la función referencial es irredueible, incluso cuando los nombre propios aparecen en enunciados modales. Se presenta aquí una exégesis de las críticas de Kripke contra cierta interpretacion metafóriea de los mundos posibles (que los considera como Iugares lejanos observados con telescopios) interpretándolas como elementos cruciales en su defensa del particularismo semántieo modal.Tbe debate between the description theory of proper names and direct reference is -mainly- a debale on whether or not the referential function of proper names is reducible in term of descriptive and logical functions. A central distinctive thesis in Kripke’s work is what I call modal semantic particularism: the referential function is irreducible even when proper names appear in modal contexts. I present all exegesis of Kripke’s comments against a certain metaphorical understanding of possible worlds (as distant countries discovered through teleseopes) according to which these comments are crucial claims in hisdefense of modal semantic particularism
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DOI | theoria200621218 |
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