Filosofia e Border Studies. Dal confine come “oggetto” al confine come “dispositivo”

Rivista di Estetica 75 (2020)
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Abstract

In the present essay we analyse the role of philosophical investigation for the interdisciplinary research field of the Border Studies. The main thesis of the paper is that a border cannot be ontologically considered as an object, and neither metaphorically as a simple line. Indeed, these approaches tend to extremely simplify the very nature of borders and bordering processes. Here we argue that borders are complex social phenomena produced by the coherent combination of several different elements. Therefore, we suggest that a fruitful way in order to conceptualize the nature of the border is the concept of dispositive, provided by Michel Foucault. The paper is structured as follows: in the first and second paragraph we show why the analysis of borders are increasingly a crucial topic both for scientific and public debate; in the third paragraph we criticize the approach provided by social ontology, focused on the conceptualization of the border as an object; in the fourth paragraph, starting from a Rousseau’s suggestion, we analyse the phenomenology of bordering practices, and we argue that a border should be understood as a complex articulation of material and immaterial elements; in the fifth paragraph we introduce the notion of dispositive in order to catch the complex nature of borders; in the conclusions we summarize the main results of the paper and we sketch possible further lines of research.

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Border.Peter Schwieger - 2019 - In Ludger Kühnhardt & Tilman Mayer (eds.), The Bonn Handbook of Globality: Volume 1. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 549-560.

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