Abstract

This project surveys the philosophical literature on the concept of liberty, as well as examines prominent theories of justice and their accordant principles of liberty. Moreover, a synthetic concept of liberty is suggested and, as a result, an alternative theory of liberty as a primary social and moral principle is developed. At the conceptual level, the notions of negative and positive liberty are surveyed and considered. It is argued that each notion of liberty is inadequate as a concept of liberty by itself, and that a concept of liberty must include aspects of each. The possibility that substantive moral theory is a legitimate activity is considered and argued for, against the claims of intuitionists. Proposed scientific methodologies are scrutinized and found to be deficient because based on an intuitionistic foundation. An alternate, and less formal, methodology for a scientific approach is found to be more acceptable because less dogmatic and more open to criticism. The relationship between conceptual analysis and the development of moral principles is found to be more far-reaching than is often thought to be the case--it is argued that the ordinary hard distinction between the two procedures is misleading and dangerous. John Rawls and Robert Nozick are employed as examples of how inadequate concepts of liberty aid in generating unacceptable principles of liberty and theories of justice. Utilitarianism is held to be acceptable only as a theory of action, or a theory of practical reasoning; but the principle of utility is held to be unacceptable as a moral principle. The two primary components of utilitarianism are held to be inconsistent with each other, i.e. consequentialism and want-regardingness. Nozick's theory of libertarianism is carefully scrutinized, as is his theory of the natural right to appropriate. Nozick's theory is held to be inconsistent with traditions in natural rights, Locke for instance, and inconsistent with libertarian thought, Proudhon and Kropotkin for example. From this critique of, essentially, individualistic libertarianism, a theory of collectivist libertarianism as a social theory is suggested and developed on moral grounds.