Abstract

This article considers the prerequisites for criminal law imputation of action undertaken within complex organizational structures. The assumption is that rules of imputation, like rules of conduct, are determined by historical and cultural factors. Accordingly, they are not objectively given but rather are relative, depending to a considerable extent on changes in values. The content of rules of imputation cannot be established until one specifies the cultural background and functions of the criminal law. In Europe, this cultural background is defined by principles intrinsic to a democratic, social welfare state governed by the rule of law and by the technical needs of a developed society. The criminal law is responsible for deterring crime and is limited by the idea of punishment based on personal culpability. Imputing the conduct of an organizational body to the organization itself or to all of its members would be a form of collective liability. That type of liability, however, would violate the principle of punishment based on individual culpability. Consequently, an act should be imputed to the person who in fact is responsible for its commission. As is usually true of complex organizations, however, the actor is often not the person responsible for deciding what must be done. In such cases, an adequate criterion needs to be developed for assigning responsibility. It is advisable to rely on responsibility for the particular organizational sector, as determined by the division of labor and definition of managerial roles. The individual responsible for the organizational sector where the act originated should also be held liable under the criminal law