Abstract

An interpretation of Isaiah Berlin’s liberal pluralism is presented in which his tragic value pluralism is embedded within, and constrained by the other ingredients of, a common moral horizon that gives priority to the value of human survival, to social rules of decency or justice that are deemed essential to survival, to a minimum core of human rights distributed and sanctioned by such rules, and to a minimum sphere of negative liberty carved out by such basic moral rights. A serious objection is that this interpretation assumes that human survival and human rights are far more important than any conflicting incommensurable values, contrary to the view associated with Berlin’s pluralism that incommensurable values are necessarily incomparable so that any conflict between them cannot be rationally resolved. But the objection is unpersuasive because, whatever Berlin’s idea of incommensurable values is, incommensurability cannot properly be reduced to incomparability: reasonable comparisons of incommensurable values are possible under plausible forms of incommensurability whereas incomparability is arguably an extreme form that tends to disappear with increasing information about competing values. It needs emphasis, however, that Berlin’s writings are marked by various ambiguities and inconsistencies, which require further critical discussion on another occasion.