A Defense of the Coherence Theory of Truth

Philosophia 26 (3-4):89-101 (1998)
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I argue that coherentists can admit that there are facts about what systems of beliefs communities accept, without being committed to the claim that these facts are the truth conditions of sentences about what communities accept. (edited)



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James Ryan
University of Miami (PhD)

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