Abstract

The introductory part of the article deals with general features of Brandom?s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom?s interpretation of Kripke?s conception of social character of rules, as well as Habermas? critique of Brandom?s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity. In the final part the author is surveying Brandom?s interpretation of Wittgenstein?s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application, and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors? perspectives rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested.