Abstract

Ethics and Architecture brings the concepts and methods of moral theory to the subject of architectural design. It finds that, following the collapse of widespread belief in Modernism's moral ideals, contemporary architectural theory and practice are subject to several competing and incompatible ethical outlooks; outlooks which provide only limited solutions to the problem of moral uncertainty. These competing architectural theories and concepts can be understood to be based in certain moral constructions, and they share the virtues and weaknesses of their moral counterparts. An argument is developed for regarding one's uncertainty as a sustainable and desirable outlook; an outlook reinforced by a reinterpretation of architecture's basic values as originally described by Vitruvius. Each of Vitruvius' values--- utilitas, venustas, and firmitas---are considered separately against problems of their interpretation, with the aid of moral theory. A fourth value is then proposed to test the adaptability of this framework. The framework developed suggests that architecture is the focus of several basic goods, goods that need not be reducible to a concept of overall good for architectural design decisions to be subject to the demands of practical reason.