Abstract

This dissertation explores the social and economic dimensions of Charles Sanders Peirce's conception of science. The author's central interpretive thesis is that, according to Peirce, the social dimension sustains the scientific enterprise in two complementary respects, corresponding to two questions concerning the success of science: how scientific knowledge is possible, and how to account for the rapid advancement of modern science. The first questions concerns the success of science conceived as an abstract possibility, which hinges on the central epistemic problem pertaining to scientific method, namely, the logical problem of induction. Here Peirce focuses on the basis of the scientific community's confidence in the logical validity and objective reach of inductive procedures. The second question concerns the factors which have contributed to the actual success of science. Here he focuses instead on the historical problem of explaining the meteoric advancement of modern science since its emergence as a mode of inquiry around the sixteenth century. ;The distinction between these two agendas marks the deepest division in Peirce's thinking about science, and separates his formal defense of the objective validity of induction from his analysis of the social and normative conditions of the success of science . Regarding the latter, the aim of scientific economy provides him with a distinct, non-epistemic point of reference from which to assess the rationality of specific social aspects of the scientific process, without compromising the central epistemic aim of truth. ;A separate chapter is devoted to Peirce's account of intersubjectivity, a notion central to his conception of science as an essentially social process, focusing particularly on his theory of observation and experiment. ;The final chapter explores in detail Peirce's theory of the economics of research , which the author suggests may prove to be Peirce's most enduring contribution to science studies