Abstract

This article deals with the question of a proper methodological strategy of interaction between psychology and neuroscience. In recent decades, due to the intensive development of neurosciences, the interaction of the two disciplines has been dominated by the theme of the search for so-called neural correlates of mental phenomena and events. Meanwhile, in recent literature, an opinion has been expressed about the possibility of a genuine integration of psychology and neuroscience. In this work, the author critically examines three recent projects of reduction of psychology to neuroscience: the conception of integration of functional and mechanistic types of explanation by the philosophers Gualtero Piccinini and Carl Craver, the project of the neurophilosophy by the famous philosopher Patricia Churchland, and the reductionist hypothesis of one of the leaders of the modern science of consciousness Stanislas Dehaene. The author shows that at the present moment there are no grounds for reduction of psychology to neuroscience. Moreover, it is noted that in the absence of real alternatives for specific empirical investigations even opponents of the strategy of identification of neural correlates of mental phenomena and events are forced to appeal to it in their works. It is argued that the currently dominating practice of identification of neural correlates of mental, cognitive and conscious phenomena will retain its leading methodological status in the interaction between psychologists and neuroscientists.