Abstract

Self-deception has been characterized in three ways: as holding contradictory beliefs, as holding a belief despite available evidence to the contrary, or as disavowal of one's engagement with the world. ;In the dissertation I endeavor to answer three questions: what is self-deception, how is it possible, and why do people engage in it? I argue that self-deception is most plausibly characterized as erroneous belief held in the face of contrary evidence. Although a self-deceptive belief may be epistemically irrational, it is often prudentially rational. Human beings are not mere truth-seekers. Instead, they adopt a number of beliefs primarily as a result of values or prudential goals rather than considerations of truth. ;I begin with Demos's conception of self-deception as lying to oneself. Lying to oneself raises the problem of self-deception: how can one intentionally adopt a belief which one knows to be erroneous? Chapter 2 reviews the analyses of three philosophers who argue that if Demos's conception of self-deception is correct, then self-deception is not possible. ;Chapter 3 sets forth Pears's characterization of self-deception as the adoption of a belief, contrary to available evidence, due to a motive. In Chapter 4, Pears's analysis of self-deception is modified. Social psychological theories of human motivation and cognition as well as Alston's theory of epistemic justification are used to argue that the self-deceived believe their erroneous beliefs to be epistemically justified. In response to the question, how is self-deception possible?, three models of self-deceptive belief formation are proposed which provide a foundation for a discussion of the rationality of self-deception in Chapter 5. ;In Chapter 6, I argue that motivations and values internalized from the social sphere, social roles and conventions, as well as institutional structures and expectations may facilitate self-deceptive belief formation. These provide a richer source for answers to the question, why do people engage in self-deception?, than does the more traditional appeal to epistemic irrationality. Finally, an example of self-deception in the corporate context is discussed in detail.