Moving Stories: Agency, Emotion and Practical Rationality

In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 145-176 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What is it to be an agent? One influential line of thought, endorsed by G. E. M. Anscombe and David Velleman, among others, holds that agency depends on practical rationality—the ability to act for reasons, rather than being merely moved by causes. Over the past 25 years, Velleman has argued compellingly for a distinctive view of agency and the practical rationality with which he associates it. On Velleman’s conception, being an agent consists in having the capacity to be motivated by a drive to act for reasons. Your bodily movements qualify as genuine actions insofar as they are motivated in part by your desire to behave in a way that makes sense to yourself. However, there are at least two distinct ways of spelling out what this drive towards self-intelligibility consists in, both present in Velleman’s work. It might consist in a drive towards intelligibility in causal-psychological terms: roughly, a drive to maximize the rational coherence of your psychological states. Alternatively, it might consist in a drive towards narrative intelligibility: a drive to make your ongoing activity conform to a recognizable narrative structure, where that structure is understood emotionally. Velleman originally saw these options as basically equivalent, but later came to prioritize the drive towards causal-psychological intelligibility over that towards narrative intelligibility. I argue that this gets things the wrong way round—we should instead understand our capacities to render ourselves intelligible in causal-psychological terms as built upon a bedrock of emotionally suffused narrative understanding. In doing so, we resolve several problems for Velleman’s view, and pave the way for an embodied, embedded and affective account of practical rationality and agency. According to the picture that emerges, practical rationality is essential to agency, narrative understanding is essential to practical rationality, and the rhythms and structures patterning the ebb and flow of our emotional lives are essential to narrative understanding.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral agency: an embodied narrative approach.Hardt Rosa Erica - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
Free will, narrative, and retroactive self-constitution.Roman Altshuler - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):867-883.
Review: Discussion: "The Guise of a Reason". [REVIEW]Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263 - 275.
Storytelling agents: why narrative rather than mental time travel is fundamental.Rosa Hardt - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):535-554.
How We Get Along.James David Velleman - 2009 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by J. David Velleman.
Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom.Matthew S. Bedke - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):85-111.
Agency, Narrative, and Mortality.Roman Altshuler - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York: Routledge. pp. 385-393.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-02-07

Downloads
760 (#22,038)

6 months
213 (#13,327)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dave Ward
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

After virtue: a study in moral theory.Alasdair C. MacIntyre - 1981 - Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

View all 44 references / Add more references