Abstract

It seems that actions are perceived from two different perspectives: on the one hand by the agent of the action and on the other hand by the observer. The latter perspective appears to be more reliable because of inter-subjective observations. Hence, determinists argue that actions can be causally explained by events, whereas the indeterminists claim that actions are acausal events. If e.g. Mary opens the door, we observe her behaviour but not her action; for it is not clear to us from our observations whether she intends to open the door, whether she opens the door unconsciously or whether she opens the door only accidentally when sleepwalking. Since actions do not consist in events, their observations involve behaviouristic fallacy. Consequently, deterministic as well as indeterministic arguments prove to be untenable. Since only the first perspective, i.e. that of the agent, remains, it is necessary to refer to the reports about their actions and to our observations of their behaviour when explicating the concept of action. This enables us to clarify the question of how far human beings are free to do, or not to do, what they want