Abstract

An answer is provided to the question of the conditions under which sentences are true. Realists claim that reality provides the truth conditions of sentences. Realism is rejected. An anti-realist position according to which truth is relative to the theories of linguistic communities is adopted. A sentence is true if and only if warranted by theories held to be correct by a community. ;Many of the standard objections to anti-realism and relativist positions are considered and refuted. Anti-realism is not self-refuting. The discovery that a sentence is warranted and yet false does not refute the theory that truth is warrant in a theory; such a discovery presupposes tacit appeal to some other theory. Realism is not required for the explanation of cognitive success. ;Following Michael Dummett, the question of what speakers know when they understand a sentence is posed. Speakers understand a sentence when they are able to apply to it the concepts of truth and falsity. Dummett's empiricist account of the conditions under which the concepts of truth and falsity are applied to sentences is rejected. These conditions are provided by the theories, not the experiences, which would warrant sentences. It is shown that all that speakers can know when they understand a sentence is that it is true if some theory, which warrants it, is correct. The concepts of truth and falsity are, therefore, applied to sentences on the basis of a knowledge of the theories which would warrant them. Theories, not reality, provide the truth conditions of sentences