ABSTRACT Whether reverse discrimination is justifiable cannot be determined, it is argued, until what is meant by ‘reverse discrimination’ has been. Recent talk of ‘reverse discrimination’ and ‘discrimination in favour of’ suggests that there are some new sorts of discrimination. But the two qualifications ‘reverse’ and ‘in favour of’ seem often to be confused in so far as it is assumed that reverse discrimination is only in favour of. After noting differences between the use of ‘discrimination’ in fiscal contexts—where the (...) phrase ‘discrimination in favour of’ has an established usage—and in political contexts, a sense of the phrase to fit the latter is proposed: to discriminate in favour of a group is to favour it at the expense of some other group so that the other group is discriminated against. The meaning of the qualification ‘reverse’ is then sought. Ambiguities in the terms ‘reverse’ and ‘compensatory’ are noted. In so far as policies described as being reverse discrimination are genuinely discriminatory, for it is not clear from their characterisation that they need constitute discrimination of any sort, it is only within a historical context that they can be distinguished from the old sort of discrimination. It is thus concluded that there are no new sorts of discrimination. (shrink)