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On relativist approaches to many-one identity

Synthese 198 (Suppl 18):4453-4465 (2018)

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  1. Two Notes on Composition.John Biro - 2022 - Metaphysica 23 (2):445-454.
    If, as some philosophers maintain, there are no composites, we do not have to ask whether, as others hold, composition is identity. Here I argue that both groups are wrong: there are composites, and composition is not identity. I examine one argument for excluding composites from our ontology, based on their alleged causal redundancy. I give reason to think that composites are ineliminable in causal explanations of macroscopic effects. I go on to argue that the relation between composites and their (...)
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  • Counting Composites.Jonathan D. Payton - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):695-710.
    I defend the thesis that Composition Entails Identity (CEI): that is, a whole is identical to all of its parts, taken together. CEI seems to be inconsistent, since it seems to require that the parts of a whole possess incompatible number properties (for instance, being one thing and being many things). I show that these number properties are, in fact, compatible.
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  • Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology.Roberto Loss - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):128-143.
    According to the thesis known as ‘Composition as Identity’ (‘CAI’), every entity is identical to the parts it fuses. Many authors in the literature acknowledge that, in spite of its controversial character, one attractive virtue of CAI is its apparent ability to give a straightforward account of the innocence of mereology. In this paper I will present a simple argument according to which CAI entails that no composite entity can be said to be ontologically innocent in the relevant sense. After (...)
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