Thanks for the thoughtful comments, Jim.

Thankfully for those like me who lack access to suitable libraries or online journals, that Nagel piece is available online:  "Public Education and Intelligent Design."

I agree that anyone interested in criticizing (or simply interpreting) Nagel should read what he actually says.  Though I am not clear on why you think he has been obscured by "a fog of ad hominems."  What unfair treatment are you talking about?

The Nagel issue is interesting, and we can only speculate as to the full extent of his sympathies and motives.  What is clear, however, is that Nagel has interpreted the work of ID supporters in self-admitted ignorance of the scientific merits (or lack thereof) of their arguments.  He simultaneously claims that, on the one hand, these IDers have legitimate criticisms of the science of evolutionary theory, and, on the other, that he is not competent to make such judgments.  Since Nagel is challenging the overwhelming consensus of the scientific community, he has opened himself up to rather harsh criticism, even more so considering the political nature of the debate.

If you think his views and/or actions have been unfairly represented, I hope you will take a moment to explain why.

In any case, thank you for correcting my oversimplifications about physicalism and creationism.

Indeed, the term "qualia" is not always interpreted within an anti-physicalist framework.  I was obviously only talking about non-materialist/physicalist notions of qualia.  (It might be noted that discussions often seem to presume that the notion of qualia poses a challenge to physicalism, that our intuitions tell us qualia are not physical phenomena, and that the burden is on physicalists to account for this problem.  It thus seems at least somewhat accurate to associate the notion of qualia with anti-physicalist agendas.  But, again, you are certainly right to point out that the notion of qualia is often discussed within purely physicalistic frameworks.  Even neuroscientists such as Ramachandran adopt the term in their discussions of the brain.)

And I accept your point that creationism does not imply anti-physicalism in the philosophy of mind.  I wonder how many creationists actually do accept physicalism in the philosophy of mind.  I suspect it is a small minority.  My thinking is that creationists seem to be attracted to a notion of divine revelation, or some such notion according to which the supernatural is apprehended in the mind.  Such would presumably be construed as a mental state, and yet could not be the result of a physical occurrence, according to theists.  (This is, of course, just a reformulation of the problem of mind/body interaction in terms of mind/God interaction.)

Regards,

Jason
Dec. 5, 2009