Thanks for your answer, I appreciate the discussion.

I'll give you your first point, but I'm still unsure about the second. I believe "oughtness" relates to some kind of standard in all the philosophically interesting cases. When you say that if A is interested in X, all things being equal, A ought to choose X, you can be saying two different things:
1) That A will choose X (which is a purely empirical matter)
2) That A has to/should choose X (which is a normative issue)
Why should A choose X? Because the rational thing to do when you have an interest seems to be to pursue it. If someone says "I'm very interested in gardening" but has a garden full of dead plants, we either think she's a liar, she deceives herself, she doesn't understand what "having a interest" means or she is irrational (and doesn't care about the things she cares about, if that makes some sense). There is a standard there, there are rules: the rules of rationality. About that, I don't think the rules of rationality are purely individual standards: I do believe there is an intersubjective, though not neccesarily moral, "obligation" towards other people to be rational. Sort of in the way Donald Davidson might have put it.

You could, of course, offer me a counter example, or an alternate account of "oughtness" that does not appeal to any kind of standards.