From PhilPapers forum Normative Ethics:

2012-04-29
Demonstrating Equality
Reply to Gerald Hull
My previous remarks have shown where things start; this will give an idea of where they end up. AKA Why not be moral?

Why would we find moral rationality intrinsically valuable? We must presume that being reasonable about conflicts of interest is separate and distinct from other forms of reasonableness, whether about inferences, quantities or nomological relations. In short, we will not try to get an ought from an is. Still, we can distinguish at least three characteristics of morality-specific rationality that appear attractive in and of themselves: its defensibility, its facilitation of cooperation, and its communal inclusiveness.

First, morality is essential for the rational defensibility of one's actions. In any conflict of interest, there will be a clear-cut difference between following morality and following self-interest: between the right thing to do and a course of action that disregards the interests of others. Only a moral action is rationally justifiable to others: that is, only the right thing can be rationally defended to the others involved in a conflict of interest [FN Various authors have remarked on the importance of justifiability in ethics; Singer, Scanlon, who else?].

Second, morality represents the only means of obtaining rational cooperation. Thus, it is an optimal strategy for fostering mutual effort: obviously, moral options provide the least grounds for rational disagreement [FN Qualify vav inoptimal fairness]. On the contrary, self-interested options, in virtue of their disregard of the interests of others, inherently encourage disunity. The benefits of cooperation, of avoiding disunity, are indisputable.

Third, morality is necessary for inclusion and participation in the rational community. Every time you selfishly disregard the interests of another, you establish a relation of enmity, not just with that person but with every reasonable individual. As Locke puts it, "such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason ... and so may be treated as beasts of prey" [FN 2nd Treatise, Ch. 3, Sec. 16]. If you are not to disassociate yourself from the common good and put yourself at odds with the rational community, you must be moral.