Abstract

Communitarian critics of liberalism complain of its tendency to produce selfish, atomized individuals; liberals reply that communities can be mere vehicles of intolerance and oppression. Both sides of this debate glimpse, but fail to pursue to the end, a single problem: What is it that gives democratic politics its specifically human dignity? In short: What is noble? This problem, which I call the problem of democratic community, is posed most forcefully by Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche would be unimpressed by the debate between communitarians and liberals, for he understands liberal individualism itself as the mask and instrument for a deeper subordination of the individual to the community; his name for modern democracy in all its forms, including liberal democracy, is "the herd." This thesis undertakes an honest examination of Nietzsche's truly radical critique of modern democracy. I begin by locating the problem of democratic community within the contemporary debate, then proceed with a general discussion of the Nietzschean critique. The primary target of that critique is modern utilitarianism. Exposing what he sees as fatal problems in the utilitarian argument itself, Nietzsche identifies a deeper basis in the morality of charity or neighbor-love, which originated in premodern Christianity, but has since been detached from the Christian faith. For Nietzsche, this secularized Christian morality is merely "herd animal morality." Having discussed this critique in a general way, I develop it through case studies of two notable advocates of democratic community. In the first place, I examine the utilitarian liberalism of John Stuart Mill. Not only is Mill a leading target of Nietzsche's critique, but he offers important clues to how democratic theorists might answer Nietzsche. Nevertheless, I find that Mill himself succumbs to the Nietzschean assault. Second, I examine the communitarianism of Alasdair MacIntyre. While MacIntyre accepts Nietzsche's critique of modernity he rejects Nietzschean politics in favor of "the Aristotelian tradition." As I argue, however, a deeper understanding of Nietzsche's critique exposes grave difficulties in MacIntyre's Aristotelianism. Having shown that Mill and MacIntyre fail to solve the problem of democratic community, I suggest that the solution can perhaps be found in the liberal virtues of prudence and freedom of mind