Abstract

Wittgenstein's conception of the difference between traditional philosophy and his own work is illuminated by contrasting his anti-theoretic remarks with the idea of a "scientific philosophy" advanced by Bertrand Russell. This dissertation constitutes a sustained argument that Wittgenstein is completely opposed to Russell's view of the nature and proper function of philosophy. ;I show that Wittgenstein's view of philosophy--that it ought to be concerned with identifying certain sicknesses in our thinking, with revealing pieces of disguised nonsense to be just that--is incompatible in its aims and methods with those of science of any stripe, and thus thoroughly at odds with Russell's grand scheme. ;I examine a work by the contemporary philosopher Peter Hacker, and I argue that it exhibits defects which parallel those found in Russell. In particular, this author makes the ironic mistake of providing us with an illustration of what Wittgenstein would regard as the old, bad, traditional philosophy, which he earnestly presents to us as an exposition of Wittgenstein's thought