Abstract

Aiming at the two-echelon newsvendor problem in which the market demand of commodities is random both in normal sales period and in liquidation period, this paper studies the pricing and ordering decision of retailers by using rational expectation equilibrium under the condition of considering consumersʼ strategic behavior and rapid response mechanism. Then, the decision-making problem under retailersʼ initial order quantity commitment is discussed, as well as the effect of commitment mechanism on supply chain performance. On this basis, both the two-part pricing contract and revenue-sharing contract are introduced to achieve supply chain coordination aiming at the profit maximization under the initial order quantity commitment mechanism. The results show that the rapid response mechanism can reduce the negative impact of consumers’ strategic behavior, and the initial order quantity commitment can further reduce the impact and improve the retailers’ profit. Both the two-part pricing contract and revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the whole supply chain in which the two-part pricing contract can distribute profit arbitrarily between manufacturers and retailers while the revenue-sharing contract can share risks among members of the supply chain.