Hume’s Third Cause

Journal of Philosophical Research 28:169-190 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is widely believed that Hume recognizes only two types of causality-one equivalent to a constant conjunction between two "objects," the other involving somesort of necessary connection between them. I will refer to these types, respectively, as "conjunction" and "necessity." I believe that Hume relies on a third type of causality-a process by which a constant conjunction of perceptions causes someone to acquire a mental habit. To remain close to Hume's terminology, I will refer to the process as "repetition." The main thesis of this paper is that this process, though causal, cannot be equated with either conjunction or necessity. Repetition is no small matter. It is the key to the correctness of Hume's overall account of causality and causal belief since it explains why humans have causal beliefs,why the causes they believe in need only be revealed in conjoined perceptions, and yet also why humans believe that a cause involves a necessary connection with its effect even though this belief is unverifiable.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Hume’s Third Cause.Peter Dalton - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:169-190.
Hume on Necessary Causal Connections.Katherin A. Rogers - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (258):517 - 521.
Necessity in Hume's Causal Theory.Leonard Greenberg - 1955 - Review of Metaphysics 8 (4):612 - 623.
Humean Causality: Inference or Relation?Peter Dalton - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:1-24.
Humean Causality.Peter Dalton - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:1-24.
Anscombe and the Metaphysics of Human Action.John Zeis - 2016 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):249-262.
Anscombe and the Metaphysics of Human Action.John Zeis - 2016 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):249-262.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-17

Downloads
15 (#974,850)

6 months
4 (#863,447)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references