Abstract

The author believes that all the transcendent philosophers agree with Hume on this fact, that the man's knowledge is obtained by the senses contact with the objects, and before this contact, the mind has no imagination. But, in these philosophers' doctrine, there are many differences with Hume's. Apart from the "forms in sensation", or in Hume's words, "impressions'", they divide all the other perceptions into three kinds: forms in imagination, first intelligibles and second intelligibles. And except the forms in imagination, they don't consider two other kinds, deriven from the forms in sensation; and unlike Hume, they don't consider universal conceptions, which are among the first intelligibes, and concepts such as causuality and substance, which are among the second intelligibles, as imaginary, at all.Instead, they consider them, particularly the second intelligibles, as the most important man's conceptions and imaginations, implying to the external world.