Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine Peirce's conception of logic as a normative science. Specifically it analyzes Peirce's notion of a normative science as an objective science of value based upon experience and considers whether this notion is consistent with Peirce's views about the nature and limit of human experience. ;Chapter 1: Peirce and the Problem of Logic and Truth. This chapter identifies three general considerations which shape Peirce's views on logic. First, these views must be placed in the context of Peirce's conception of philosophy as an empirical and observational science. The second is Peirce's firm rejection of psychologism and his resulting insistence that logic be objective. The third is a basic philosophical strategy which seeks to identify a genuine motiviation for reasoning logically as an alternative to demonstrating that logical inferences preserve truth. ;Chapter 2: Logic as a Normative Science. While Peirce did not have a single and consistent view of normative science, it seems fair to reject those portions of his writings which make normative science a subject for a priori reasoning or justify our knowledge of logical relations by an appeal to some mysterious visual perception of these relations. Instead the thesis examines Peirce's notion of logical reasoning which treats it as a special case of conduct under self-control. As such, our efforts at reasoning may be reviewed to determine whether they conform to our ideal of sound reasoning. Pleasures and pains play a central role in this process. ;Chapter 3: The Self as a Purposive Being. The above notion of normative science is compared with the notion of "self" which follows from Peirce's early rejection of introspective powers to determine whether these early views are compatible with the notion of a "self" which controls conduct with the purpose of conforming it to an ideal. The conclusion is that the notion of purposive conduct requires some measure of introspection. ;Chapter 4: Cognition of Value. This chapter considers whether Peirce's early theory of cognition can accommodate his later views about the nature of pleasures and pains and the role they play in normative sciences. It concludes that the theory can accommodate these phenomena but only in such a way that logic is not objective in the required sense