Abstract

The notion of superstition has a long history of being understood in terms of epistemic and psychological features, although many discussions include its problematic political consequences. I argue that Spinoza’s discussion of superstition in Theological-Political Treatise is an exception. Spinoza connects superstition and piety with the problem of political stability via the notion of obedience, and uses the term “superstitious” to label religious attitudes and practices that undermine civil obedience by establishing demands of allegiance, on the part of the religious authority, that compete with those of the government. Contrary to existing interpretations, I will show that, for Spinoza, “superstition” is not intrinsically characterized by features such as intolerance and anti-intellectualism. In Theological-Political Treatise, practices that clearly shows these traits are labeled as pious, rather than superstitious, precisely because, within certain societies, they foster obedience and therefore stability. One of Spinoza’s goals in TTP is to show that what counts as pious among the ancient Jews or in the Ottoman Empire should be considered superstitious in a more modern, diverse society such as the seventeenth century Dutch Republic, and that libertas philosophandi is the best way to inoculate a society against superstition.