Abstract

One of Karl Popper's main aims in The Logic of Scientific Discovery is to solve the problem of induction. As he formulates it, the problem of induction is a conflict between the demand that all scientific statements be decidable, and the inadmissibility of inductive arguments. Popper tries to solve this problem by showing that, if we lessen this demand to the requirement that all scientific statements be falsifiable, science can search for true scientific theories rationally, without using induction. This is because it is possible to deduce the falsity of theories from the truth of "basic statements." ;Popper's account of science, however, encounters a new problem, for it seems as if we cannot ascertain the truth-values of basic statements. Popper calls this "the problem of the empirical basis." To solve this problem, most empiricists adopt the view that perceptual experiences, although not a criterion of truth for basic statements, are nevertheless a reason for their acceptance. Popper, however, rejects this theory , and adopts instead a conventionalist theory of the empirical basis. On his view, basic statements are accepted by a "free decision"; they can neither be justified, nor completely tested. ;Critics have long taken Popper to task for his conventionalism. They argue that we have no reason to prefer an unrefuted theory to a 'refuted' theory, if we have no reason to think that accepted basic statements are true. Furthermore, Popper cannot avoid this problem by turning to psychologism, for perceptual experiences can constitute reasons for accepting basic statements only if inductive inferences are presupposed. Since conventionalism and psychologism exhaust the viable alternatives, Popper cannot solve the problem of induction. ;The aim of this dissertation is to answer the question: If Popper must choose either conventionalism or psychologism, does it follow that he fails to solve the problem of induction? This question is answered affirmatively by arguments that show: that Popper's conventionalism undermines his attempted solution to the problem of induction, that psychologism does not entail inductivism, and that, in spite of this, Popper can give no reason to search for truth with his empiricist methodology, rather than a logically consistent, non-empirical alternative, unless he invokes induction