Computational complexity in the design of voting rules

Theory and Decision 80 (1):33-41 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper considers the computational complexity of the design of voting rules, which is formulated by simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.

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