Abstract

Simply stated, there is presently a basic tension between those philosophers who argue that scientific "knowledge" is merely relative to a theory one possesses and those who hold that science obtains knowledge about the real physical world. The latter are often called scientific realists. Scientific realists generally argue that there is a direct relationship between scientific theories and Reality such that theories may correctly describe and correspond to Reality. But they generally seek to establish this through a reduction ad absurdum argument in which they argue for the unintelligibility of "theory-relativists", or by seeking to ground the ontologies of theories on an epistemological analysis of scientific knowledge. It is our thesis that there can be no knowledge without awareness, but that there can be awareness without knowledge. Thus we argue that scientific knowledge, and hence scientific realism, have their epistemic basis in an ontologically significant awareness. ;Therefore, while our approach to scientific realism comprises an epistemological methodology, this methodology will be based on phenomenological analysis of awareness . Our analysis, indebted to Sartre's phenomenology, yields the notion of a theory-neutral element in observational awareness. Building on Newton-Smith's rational argument for scientific realism, we argue that our methodology renders tenable a strong scientific realism. This realism is juxtaposed to the view of Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, with special attention to epistemological difficulties surrounding observation. Finally, we discuss the implications of our position for the commensurability of theories, verisimilitude, and scientific method