Abstract

The article‘s focus is on the interpretative approach to Hölderlin‘s Judgement and Being. This text is regarded by the Henrich school as a tex, that opens a new and original path in the development of German classical philosophy. In their view, Judgement and Being at the moment of it‘s origin is a critique of Fichte‘s Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, a critique that offers a serious alternative to Fichte‘s philosophy. The article first tries to offer reasons for approaching Judgement and Being through Kantian concepts of the necessary ideas of reason, of transcendental ideal and of the possibility of the positive use of reason. Furthermore, the article tries to dispute the main thesis of the Henrich school by demonstrating that Judgement and Being is more a comment on the basic features of Fichtean philosophy than its critique. The article tries to show that, in attempting to evaluate the weight and reach of Judgement and Being, we are sooner or later faced with an alternative: either competence without originality, or originality without competence.