Online research in philosophy

Analysing the EU’s System of Government on the basis of the treaties establishing the Community and the Union leads to identifying five basic government functions, which are distributed in a complex system of checks and balances between the EU institutions and between the latter and member states’ institutions. Those five functions may be characterised as legislative function, which evolved over time from rule making to law making, the executive function which consists in implementing common policies, the supervisory function, consisting of judicial review and of oversight of member state’s compliance with their treaty obligations, the function of direction, consisting of policy guidance and programming, and an organic function consisting in institutional development. The new wording of the relevant treaty clauses by the Lisbon treaty clarifies the nature and distribution of these five functions and thus enable us to understand how separation of powers is organised in the EU.

Making a first sketch of philosophical issues arising fromEuropean Community law I want to present a series ofmore or less obvious, and more or less interrelated dilemmas,or even double binds.(i) Deepening the community becomes incompatible withwidening membership. (ii) National states seem bothnecessary for and obstructive in articulating transnationalproblems. (iii) The more democracy is needed as a warrantfor the public exercise of political power in Europe, themore the very concept of democracy on a European scaleevades understanding. (iv) European unity presupposes aunifying rule of law, while member states have radicallydifferent conceptions of this principle. (v) Even the verycore of European integration, the common market, is subjectto two conflicting and, indeed, incompatible doctrines ofcompetition. In explaining the nature of each dilemma I willtry to take my cue from the Maastricht Treaty wherever thisseems suitable. Then I will elaborate on the jurisprudentialproblems involved in it. Finally, each section will be closedby an attempt to state the nature of these problems inphilosophical terms.

: The European patent system allows for the introduction of moral issues into decisions about the granting of patents. This feature has greatly impacted European debates about the patenting of biotechnology. This essay explores the European experience, in both the European Union and the European Patent Organization. It argues that there has been great confusion surrounding these issues primarily because the Europeans have not developed a general theory about when exclusion from patentability is the best social mechanism for dealing with morally offensive technologies.

On 1 June 2005, the Dutch voters said no to the ratification of the "European Constitution" with a clear majority of 62% (at a turnout rate of 63%). To many domestic as well as international observers, this result came as a surprise. After describing the run-up to the Dutch referendum and the campaign for it, this contribution reviews the various explanations that have been presented to explain the outcome and tries to put the events in a broader context. On the basis of these findings for the Dutch case, the authors formulate a perspective on how to move on from here with the European constitutionalisation process.

Making a first sketch of philosophical issues arising from European Community law I want to present a series of more or less obvious, and more or less interrelated dilemmas, or even ‘double binds’. (i) Deepening the community becomes incompatible with widening membership. (ii) National states seem both necessary for and obstructive in articulating transnational problems. (iii) The more democracy is needed as a warrant for the public exercise of political power in Europe, the more the very concept of democracy on a European scale evades understanding. (iv) European unity presupposes a unifying rule of law, while member states have radically different conceptions of this principle. (v) Even the very core of European integration, the common market, is subject to two conflicting and, indeed, incompatible doctrines of competition. In explaining the nature of each dilemma I will try to take my cue from the Maastricht Treaty wherever this seems suitable. Then I will elaborate on the jurisprudential problems involved in it. Finally, each section will be closed by an attempt to state the nature of these problems in philosophical terms.

The creation of a European law of civil procedure is a continuous and dynamic process that, in its present form has really only just started. In this contribution three issues involved in the creation of a European law of civil procedurewill be discussed. These issues are (1) the meaning of Article 65 of the EC Treaty for legislation in the field of law of civil procedure; (2) the choice between a separate European regime or a harmonization of national provisions in specific files; and (3) the emergence of sectoral European law of civil procedure in internal market dossiers, such as procurement law, intellectual property law and competition law and very recently, consumer law. In providing an outline of these issues, the author demonstrates some of the difficulties met in the creation of European civil procedural law. Moreover, the article intends to set the debate on the subject in motion and to contribute to finding answers to the issues discussed in it.

Questions of political identity and citizenship, raised by the creation of the `new Europe', pose new questions that political theorists need to consider. Reflection upon the circumstances of the new Europe could help them in their task of delineating conceptual structures and investigating the character of political argument.Does it make sense to use concepts as `citizenship' and `identity' beyond the borders of the nation-state? What does it mean when we speak about `European Citizenship' and `European Identity'? It is argued that the pluralism that has led theorists to offer a conception of citizenship based upon principles of right, rather that the common good, applies even more strongly at the level of the European political order. Developing a contractarian theory of federation, an account of the basis of a European citizenship will be offered in which federalism emerges out of an overlapping consensus of European citizens on the terms of their political association. `European Citizenship' and `European Identity' are discussed in the context of the so-called `European Union', and not in the wider context of Europe `as a whole', or for that matter on an even broader `cosmopolitan' scale. However, the gist of the article is that arguments for concepts of `citizenship' and `identity' that go beyond borders of nation-states and that are applied to the `European Union', could have implications for an even wider application.Finally, and in conclusion, the (empirical) context will be elaborated in which the normative concept of shared liberal citizenship identity should be realized on a pan-national, European level.

This contribution aims to explain how European Criminal Law can be understood as constitutive of European identity. Instead of starting from European identity as a given, it provides a philosophical analysis of the construction of self-identity in relation to criminal law and legal tradition. The argument will be that the self-identity of those that share jurisdiction depends on and nourishes the legal tradition they adhere to and develop, while criminal jurisdiction is of crucial importance in this process of mutual constitution. This analysis will be complemented with a discussion of the integration of the first and the third pillar as aimed for by the Constitutional Treaty (TE), which would bring criminal law under majority rule and European democratic control. Attention will be paid to two ground breaking judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that seem to boil down to the fact that the Court actually manages to achieve some of the objectives of the CT even if this is not in force. This gives rise to a discussion of how the CT (and related judgements of the ECJ) may transform European criminal law in the Union to EU criminal law of the Union, thus producing an identity of the Union next to the identities prevalent in the Union. The contribution concludes with some normative questions about the kind of European identity we should aim to establish, given the fact that such identity will arise with further integration of criminal law into the first pillar.

The Lisbon Reform Treaty would improve the role of the sub-national level in the European Union institutional framework. Not only the intended institutional reforms but also the process that led to the Reform Treaty - the European Convention, the Constitutional Treaty, and the period of reflection - strengthened the presence of the regions in the European decision-making process and improved network building within the regions and the system of "Muli-Level Governance" in Europe. In this system of Multi-Level Governance the German Laender followed their two main strategies. The first was to search direct ways to affect actors on every level ("let us in") and the second was to save their own autonomy regarding their own politics ("leave us alone"). Obviously there was no big bang of great expansion of regional rights in the constitutional treaty or in the treaty of Lisbon. But nobody - the regions neither - would have thought that such a big bang would come. It seems to be a path dependent strengthening of the role of the regions.

The Lisbon Treaty tries to improve in efficiency and accountability in European Union (EU) trade policy-making. This paper recognizes the validity of the EU Member States' misgivings about giving too prominent a role to the European Commission. Have we now reached after the Lisbon Treaty reforms an adequate institutional balance in EC trade policy?