JS:  You imply that Dennett's approach does not or perhaps even cannot deal with such aspects of humanity.  I wonder why you would say that.

So what does he say about them?  I don't recall anything of this nature in his book. (Though admittedly I only skimmed it, because I found it very tedious.)

JS: By your standards, the term "consciousness" has no place in the language and should best be forgotten, because any attempt to discuss it cannot be worthwhile until we have understood everything there is to understand about human beings, and then some.

On the contrary, I think consciousness is a perfectly valid term, and I do not think that, in order to discuss it, we have to understand 'everything there is to be understood about human beings' (a rather tall order!) 

But I do think, as I tried to suggest, that any worthwhile discussion of human consciousness needs to get beyond the narrow confines of things like 'seeing the colour red', people in comas, and monkeys looking into mirrors. It has to acknowledge, and accept, the full richness and complexity of human experience - which I tried to evoke by the examples I gave you - not limit its purview to some contrived, laboratory version of human life.

DA