Derek,
In response to David, I concur.
Your wrote:
Your comment about "The analytics' proclivity for reasoned argument" also bothers me. Personally, I find an awful lot of argument by analytics to be lacking in reasoned argument - that is, on crucial points. My claim about an unwillingness to examine presuppositions about "our world" - or, more generally, the "real" - is an example.

However, it seems that at rock bottom, what an Analytic defaults to is "intuition," like pulling the ontological rabbit from the hat, and we are all supposed to just sit in agreement that yes, there is a rabbit, so obviously...

Symbol pushing is not all there is to reason.
At some point, we have to wonder why these symbols in this particular relation.
Wittgenstein was doing phenomenology in the Tractatus,
showing us the why of the relations, of course, but also how it is that some stand as nonsense and others as fundamental.
My point being, if any here are intimate with that work, a given pattern will be accepted without question when it maps onto previous relations, confirms them, and is counted as an advance when proceeding from established presumptions without contradiction.  Any other notion of advance is considered nonsense, as are questions about what arises between the different nodes of relationships, that is what fills in the blank spots in the ontology.  So, any question about real world or common world draws a blank stare, as a reflection of the fact that there just isn't an answer there.  It has not been sensed, felt, the object that might constitute the answer so far non-sense in that way.

In the end, I count Wittgenstein not as an Analytic, but as a Continental, for this reason.
He didn't stop with intuition, but showed us where these intuitions come from...