AT: "The key question [is] "How does the brain create the gloriously varied content of consciousness?"  

          SH: That question will not be answered either. We will find out how the brain generates adaptive behavioral capacity, and, given that generating               that capacity also happens to feel like something, we will find out the correlates (and probable causes) of those feelings.

We can do more than find out how the brain generates adaptive behavioral capacity. Importantly, we can also find out how the human brain generates its phenomenal representation of the world to which it has to adapt.

AT: "specifying putative neuronal mechanisms that can be demonstrated to generate activities in the brain that are analogous [to] feelings"

          SH: That is unfortunately just correlates again.

I don't agree. Brain analogs of feelings (conscious content) are much more than simple correlates of feelings, The significant distinction is that correlates which are not also analogs of feelings have only the relationship of systematic co-occurrence with the feelings, while analogs of the feelings have at least some properties that are similar to salient aspects of the feelings. The difference is illustrated in these experimental findings:

1. In binocular rivalry experiments it has been found that a particular neuron in the visual system fires above threshold when one of the competing stimuli is perceived, and stops firing when the other stimulus is perceived. This is an example of a simple correlation between a feeling and a brain event.

2. In studies of the perception of equal sized objects in 2D perspective drawings it has been found that the "distant" object in the perspective drawing is judged to be larger than its equal sized "nearer" object. Brain scans (fMRI) taken at the same time show an enlargement of the area of neuronal activity in the primary visual cortex which corresponds to the ratio of the judged/perceived size of the far object compared to the near object. This is an example of an analog relationship between a feeling and a brain event.

My contention is that brain analogs of this kind are much more informative than mere correlates and provide powerful empirical data that we can use to test our theoretical models. 

AT: "unlike the smell of a rose, the elementary properties and detailed spatial relationships in our feeling of a triangle can be displayed in an external expression which others can observe and examine" 

         SH: I'm afraid I can't agree: The geometric properties of detecting and manipulating triangles are functing, and unproblematic. What it feels like            to see or imagine or manipulate a triangle, in contrast, is every bit as problematic as what it feels like to see red. (Lockean primary and                      secondary properties don't help here.)

I'm not talking here about detecting and manipulating a triangle. I'm talking about our external expression (e.g., in a verbal report or drawing) of our internal phenomenal representation (feeling) of a triangle. The problem of getting a good external expression of what it feels like to see red is much harder.