From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2009-05-12
The 'Explanatory Gap'
Reply to Derek Allan

WHEREOF ONE CANNOT SPEAK...

DA: "Nothing in what I said alluded to what might happen to be [THE OBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS].  My point is that there seems to be an assumption... that there is no important difference between [BEING CONSCIOUS AS] a human and [BEING "CONSCIOUS"] (can we even use the same word?) [AS] an animal. What on earth could justify this huge assumption? Your change of vocabulary doesn't make any material difference so I will leave that aside." 
Here is the transcription into the vocabulary that you think makes no material difference:

"Nothing in what I said alluded to what might happen to be WHAT IS BEING FELT.  My point is that there seems to be an assumption... that there is no important difference between FEELING WHAT a human FEELS and "FEELING" (can we even use the same word?) WHAT an animal FEELS. What on earth could justify this huge assumption? Your change of vocabulary doesn't make any material difference so I will leave that aside." 

As this transcription should illustrate, the change of vocabulary makes it clear that you are talking about differences in what humans and animals may be feeling, whereas what is at issue is whether they are feeling (anything at all).
DA: "to say that something is like itself (which is what this effectively amounts to) is mere verbiage."
No. Reminding ourselves that we all (including animals) feel, and that, stones, (today's) robots -- and just about everything other than people and animals -- do not feel is not mere verbiage. It is perfectly comprehensible and perfectly true (except if one is determined to play the verbal game of Achilles and the Tortoise [or one is unable to do otherwise), in which case further verbiage will indeed make no material difference).


-- SH