2009-05-14
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The 'Explanatory Gap'
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Arnold TrehubUniversity of Massachusetts, Amherst
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AT: "Why, exactly, do you believe that the brain states that constitute our feelings can't ever be explained?" SH: " Because in every attempt to explain the functional role of feeling, feeling turns out to be functionally superfluous (except iftelekinetic dualism is true, and feelings have causal power -- but it isn't, and they don't). ..... I hereby make the same challenge for "explanations" of the functional or causal role of feeling: Tell me what it is, and I will show it is functionally superfluous on its own terms."
Stevan, I have the feeling that the very way in which you propose the notion of a feeling-function divide implicitly precludes any possibility of a causal role for feeling. Because of this feeling on my part, I am writing this response to you. Would you claim that this feeling on my part plays no causal role in my typing the post that you are now reading? .. AT
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