Abstract

In the first chapter we consider an account of 'I' sketched by Wittgenstein in The Blue and Brown Books. Sidney Shoemaker has proposed a theory intended to function as an alternative to Wittgenstein's, and in Chapter I we also evaluate this account. The conclusion of the chapter is that both views are unsound because they are based upon epistemological factors irrelevant, in the final analysis, to a semantic account of 'I'. Chapter II investigates the idea that the first-person singular refers "indirectly" whereas Chapter III investigates the idea that 'I' refers "directly." Frege's Theory of Sense and Denotation provides our example of a theory of indirect reference. Frege believed that 'I' accomplishes reference for the speaker of it by means of an "incommunicable" sense and it accomplishes reference for its auditors by means of a "communicable" sense. The argument of the chapter is that the implications of this account are sufficiently objectionable to undermine the assimilation of 'I' to Fregean names. In Chapter III we present an exposition and critical examination of a recent alternative to the Theory of Sense and Denotation. This is David Kaplan's Theory of Direct Reference. ;In Chapter IV we begin the constructive aspects of the study. Kaplan's particular account of 'I', however, provides the backdrop against which the non-referential account of 'I' is developed. Building upon Saul Kripke's distinction between semantic referent and speaker's referent, we introduce the contrasting notions of semantic reference and speaker's reference. In the section of Chapter IV devoted to a discussion of the pragmatics of the first person singular it is argued that, to the speaker of 'I', we ought to ascribe an act of speaker's indication, as against an act of speaker's reference. In the sections devoted to a discussion of the semantics of 'I', it is argued that the relation that 'I' bears to its speaker, on a given occasion of use, is misleadingly conceived as semantic reference. Instead, in an account intended to parallel the pragmatic description proposed earlier, we claim that the relation is better described as semantic indication. The occurrence of 'I' within propositional contexts presents the most difficult challenge to the non-referential account proposed in Chapter IV. In Chapter V we distinguish between the operation of 'I' within what might be termed enabling expressions and its operation within what might be termed enabled propositions. We then show how this distinction can aid in the resolution of the difficulties surveyed. Finally, in Chapter VI we show how the proposed, non-referential account of 'I' has significant implications for the problems of self-knowledge, personal identity, and the predication of existence. ;A number of long standing philosophical puzzles find their source in the common assumption that, in the final analysis, the personal pronoun 'I' is designed to make singular reference. This dissertation involves an attempt to challenge that assumption. The conclusion of the study is that if one constructs a model of singular reference on the basis of proper names, definite descriptions and indexicals; then it is misleading to treat 'I' as a singularly referring expression. The study is divided, about evenly, between critical and constructive parts. The first three chapters consist of a critical examination of four theories each of which takes 'I' to be a referring expression. The second three chapters involve an attempt to develop, defend, and probe the implications of a non-referential account of 'I'