Bragging

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):263-272 (2014)
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Abstract

The speech act of bragging has never been subjected to conceptual analysis until now. We argue that a speaker brags just in case she makes an utterance that is an assertion and is intended to impress the addressee with something about the speaker via the belief produced by the speaker's assertion. We conclude by discussing why it is especially difficult to cancel a brag by prefacing it with, ‘I'm not trying to impress you, but…’ and connect this discussion with Moore's paradox and the recent neologism ‘humblebrag’.

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Author Profiles

Mark Alfano
Macquarie University
Brian Robinson
Texas A&M University - Kingsville

References found in this work

Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Intention and convention in speech acts.Peter F. Strawson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):439-460.
Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning.H. P. Grice - 1968 - Foundations of Language 4 (3):225-242.

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