Cognitive communication at the level of language and philosophy in Islamic thought

Al-Daleel 4 (13):88-111 (2021)
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Abstract

Nowadays, we are facing intellectual and political currents, standing against accordance and compliance among peoples and nations, which might justify some strategists’ speculations of the inevitability of the clash of civilizations. This means that we shall be governed by the law of chaos in this respect. Our study wants to shed light on the possibility of cognitive communication according to what Muslim scholars see, focusing on analyzing the way in which language and concept can mediate in our dialogue, where language mediates between communicators. We have called this as traditional and moral communication, but when concept mediates between communicators, we have called it as real and philosophical communication. So, the concept of cognitive communication is a common statement between communicators. Based on the invention of language, the value of traditional communication is inventive, which has led philosophers to follow demonstrative communication as an alternative, where the value shall be universal and fixed, provided that there would a mutual influence between them that could leave an impact on their value. We have deducted, from the concept of intuition, the principle of methodological objectivity, and we also have established the principle of methodological plurality out of social upbringing that manipulates the properties of concepts; so, intuitive concepts have changed to theoretical ones, and theoretical concepts have changed to intuitive ones. These two are exclusive in this article, through which we claim the possibility of solving philosophical communication crises.

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