Abstract

The goal of this dissertation is to explore and evaluate Ronald Dworkin's hermeneutical theory of law. I argue that Dworkin 's theory of law is a "hermeneutical theory." I justify my classification and show how Dworkin's theory fits in the contemporary debates in hermeneutics and how it contributes to these debates. I relate Dworkin's hermeneutical theory to the works of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jurgen Habermas. ;I thematize the dialogical and reconstructive nature of Dworkin's hermeneutical theory, and I argue that Dworkin's hermeneutical theory has the resources to respond to the fundamental charges of solipsism and of misunderstanding the relation of law and literature . ;I also relate Dworkin's hermeneutical theory to the law and literature movement in legal scholarship, and I argue that legal interpretation is a form of story-telling. ;I illustrate my interpretation by discussing several landmark U.S. decisions, Brown v. Board of Education , Griswold v. Conn. , and Texas v. Johnson . I also discuss a landmark South African judicial decision, The State v. T. Makwanyane and M. Mechunu